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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GORDON C. MeGA VIN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
PREFERRED INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
. . . WAYNE MURRAY and WAYNE 
MURRAY, JR., doing business as MUR-
RAY & COMPANY, a co-partnership, 
UTAH MOTOR CLUB, INC., a corpora-
tion, and SAM ARGE, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
(a) Preliminary Statement 
No . 
8714 
This is an appeal from a judgment of dismissal of the 
action entered by the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
Utah, on May 29, 1957, in civil No. 106,957 (R. 44-45). 
The motion to dismiss the amended complaint was filed by 
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defendan.ts and respondents herein (R. 38). Preferred Under-
writers, Inc., the attorney-in-fact for Preferred Insurance Ex-
change, is a foreign corporatoin which never has qualified 
to do business in Utah (R. 17, 33). No service of process has 
been obtained on said foreign corporation, and it is not one 
of the respondents on this appeal. 
The motion to dismiss the amended complaint was based 
on the allegation that the said amended complaint ((does not 
state any facts or grounds upon which relief can be granted 
against these defendants or any of them." (R. 38). The District 
Court furnished no explanation as a basis for granting the 
motion to dismiss. 
(b) The Amended Complaint 
The prime question to be determined on this appeal is 
whether the amended complaint states facts upon which relief 
can be granted against the defendants and respondents or any 
of them. We set forth the entire amended complaint, except 
for the title of the action (R. 28-32): 
t (The plaintiff comes now by leave of court first had 
and obtained, and files this amended complaint, where-
by plaintiff complains against defendants and for cause 
of action alleges: 
t t 1. Defendant Preferred Insurance Exchange, now 
is and was at all times herein mentioned, a reciprocal 
insurance exchange, unincorporated, transacting busi-
ness through and under its attorney-in-fact, Preferred 
Underwriters, Inc., a corporation not organized under 
the laws of the State of Utah. During the times herein-
after mentioned, said Preferred Insurance Exchange 
has engaged in business in the State of Utah through 
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state, district and local agents, writing automobile and 
liability insurance. 
''2. Defendant Preferred Underwriters, Inc., in addi-
tion to acting as attorney-in-fact for Preferred Insurance 
Exchange, since about January, 195 5 has been engaged 
in business in the State of Utah as a general insurance 
agency for writing of fire insurance and other insurance. 
Said Preferred Underwriters, Inc., has never qualified 
to do business in the State of Utah as a foreign corpora-
tion. 
"3. Defendants Wayne Murray and Wayne Murray, 
Jr., were at all times herein mentioned, a co-partnership 
engaged in the insurance business as Murray & Com-
pany. Defendant Wayne Murray, Jr., was at all times 
herein mentioned the president and general manager 
of Preferred Insurance Exchange, and also the presi-
dent and general manager of Preferred Underwriters, 
Inc., a foreign corporation. 
"4. Defendant Utah Motor Club, Inc., now is and 
was at all times herein mentioned, a corporation of 
Utah. Defendant Sam Arge was at all times herein 
mentioned, general manager of said Utah Motor Club, 
Inc. 
"5. On or about January 20, 1955, Preferred Under-
writers, Inc., as attorney-in-fact for Preferred Insurance 
Exchange, by written instrument appointed Paul J. 
Parish, of Montebello, California, as state agent in U tab 
for Preferred Insurance Exchange. Preferred Under-
writers, Inc., also appointed Paul J. Parish as state 
agent in Utah to write fire insurance and other insur-
ance. Wayne Murray and Wayne Murray, Jr., doing 
business as Murray & Company, also appointed Paul 
J. Parish as state agent in Utah to write life insurance 
and other insurance. Said defendants instructed Paul J. 
Parish to set up an office in Utah and to appoint such 
agents as said Parish deemed essential to establish an 
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organization through which automobile, casualty, fire, 
liability, life and other insurance could be sold in the 
State of Utah. 
((6. On or about March 10, 1955, said Paul J. Parish, 
state agent for said defendants, entered into agreement 
with plaintiff whereby plaintiff was appointed an agent 
for Preferred Insurance Exchange and an agent for 
Preferred Underwriters, Inc., in Utah, and plaintiff 
was also appointed acting state agent to assist said 
Paul J. Parish in the management of the state agency 
for Preferred Insurance Exchange and for Preferred 
Underwriters, Inc. Paul J. Parish promised that plaintiff 
would be paid the regular agent's commission on all 
policies sold direct! y by him and also receive a share 
of the overriding commissions on all insurance sold 
in the State of Utah for Preferred Insurance Exchange, 
until the plaintiff received $1,000.00 per month. Said 
Paul J. Parish told plaintiff that plaintiff would have 
an opportunity for permanent employment at a sub-
stantial income. 
((7. Said defendants were informed of said appoint-
ment and employment, and about April 1955, defend-
ants Preferred Insurance Exchange and Preferred Un-
derwriters, Inc., approved and acquiesced in said ap-
pointment and employment of plaintiff as an agent for 
said companies and as acting state agent in Utah. Said 
defendants instructed plaintiff to procure state licenses 
from the State of Utah to sell automobile and fire in-
surance, which plaintiff did; and said two defendants 
told plaintiff to proceed to appoint district and local 
agents, and said defendants promised to file with the 
State Insurance Department a power of attorney author-
izing hin1 to appoint agents. Said defendants also 
promised: (a) To furnish promptly to plaintiff adver-
tising tnatter to start a sales campaign; (b) to promptly 
file with the State Insurance Department, all necessary 
rate schedules essential to meet competitors, to enable 
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plaintiff and local agents to obtain a substantial volume 
of business; (c) to file any other documents which 
might be essential to carry on a diversified insurance 
business in Utah; (d) to furnish plaintiff without delay 
assistance in the training of agents for selling insurance; 
and (e) to give plaintiff such further assistance as 
would be necessary to build up a state organization in 
Utah to assure Paul J. Parish and plaintiff a good 
volume of business and a substantial income. 
((8. Said defendants further told plaintiff that he 
should not concern himself with quotas in Utah for the 
time being, nor be too much concerned about selling 
policies himself, but that he should direct his chief 
efforts to finding suitable agents, to bel p train agents, 
to take care of administrative work, to conduct investi-
gations requested by said defendants, and to make other 
contacts deemed essential by defendants to promote 
good public relations. Defendants told plaintiff that he 
would make a substantial income out of overriding 
commissions from future business in Utah, and that 
notwithstanding some time would elapse before such 
income would be obtained, as the program was a long 
range program, he would obtain a much greater income 
than if he spent his time selling. 
((9. Plaintiff relied on the promises of said Preferred 
Insurance Exchange, Preferred Underwriters, Inc., and 
Murray & Company, and plaintiff traveled through the 
State at his own expense to find suitable agents for 
Preferred Insurance Exchange, and said defendants 
recognized said agents so appointed. Plaintiff con-
ducted all of the investigations requested by said de-
fendants, made all of the contacts requested by defend-
ants, and performed all other administrative duties 
assigned to him between April and October 1955, all 
at his own expense. 
n 10. Said defendants failed and neglected to perform 
their promises as set forth in paragraph 7 hereof: (a) 
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Preferred Insurance Exchange and Preferred Under-
writers, Inc., as attorney-in-fact for Preferred Insurance 
Exchange, sent advertising material which was false and 
misleading, in that said advertising material represented 
that Preferred Insurance Exchange offered lower rates 
than competitors, when in fact some rates were higher; 
and notwithstanding plaintiff informed defendants that 
said material was having an adverse effect in Utah, 
said defendants did not make any new advertising 
material available until September 1955, just prior to 
time Preferred Underwriters, Inc., appointed Utah 
Motor Club, Inc., state agent for Preferred Insurance 
Exchange. (b) Said defendants did not :file any com-
petitive rate schedules until July 1955, nor until plaintiff 
conducted the investigations requested by said defend-
ants. (e) Said defendants delayed until September 
1955, the sending of any representative to Utah to give 
assistance in a sales training program. (d) Said de-
fendants neither filed a power of attorney for plaintiff, 
nor filed the necessary documents essential to qualify 
Preferred Insurance Exchange and Preferred Under-
writers, Inc., to engage in business in Utah. (e) Instead 
of giving plaintiff assistance essential to help build 
a state organization in Utah to assure Paul J. Parish 
and plaintiff a good volume of business and a substan-
tial incon1e, after learning that plaintiff had contacted 
Utah Motor Club, Inc., in an effort to appoint said 
corporation a district agent, said Preferred Insurance 
Exchange, Preferred Underwriters, Inc., and Murray 
& Company, without the consent of plaintiff and with-
out the consent of Paul J. Parish, entered into an agree-
ment with Utah Motor Club, Inc., and Sam Arge, 
whereby Utah Motor Club, Inc., on or about September 
28, 1955, \vas appointed state agent in Utah for Pre-
ferred Insurance Exchange by Preferred Underwriters, 
Inc., notwithstanding Preferred Insurance Exchange 
and Preferred Underwriters, Inc., and Murray and 
Cotnpany promised plaintiff that no deal would be made 
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with Utah Motor Club, Inc., except one which would 
be satisfactory to plaintiff. (f) Said defendants also 
procured from plaintiff the list of contacts of insurance 
prospects from plaintiff in October 195 5, for the pur-
pose of giving the same to Utah Motor Club, Inc., to 
enable Utah Motor Club, Inc., to reap benefits from 
the efforts of the plaintiff. (g) Said defendants Pre-
ferred Insurance Exchange, Preferred Underwriters, 
Inc., and Murray & Company, in September 1955, in-
duced plaintiff to go to the expense and take the time 
necessary to arrange for a meeting of all district and 
local agents, on the promise that he was going to have 
a substantial income from his position, while at the 
same time said defendants were negotiating behind the 
back of plaintiff to deprive plaintiff of present and 
future compensation by way of overriding commissions 
which said defendants had promised, and to transfer 
the business over to Utah Motor Club, Inc., without 
compensation to plaintiff whatsoever. 
((II. Plaintiff was given no notice of termination of 
his employment, nor any compensation for his services. 
By the acts of the defendants they made it impossible 
for Paul J. Parish to perform his agreement with plain-
tiffs, notwithstanding Preferred Insurance Exchange 
and Preferred Underwriters, Inc., and Murray & Com-
pany approved said appointment made by Paul J. 
Parish and induced plaintiff to perform services for 
seven months. In October 195 5, said defendants falsely 
represenetd that Paul J. Parish had resigned as state 
agent, and that plaintiff should contact Sam Arge of 
Utah Motor Club, Inc. Thereupon, about November 1, 
1955, Utah Motor Club, Inc., informed plaintiff that 
it had been appointed state agent in place of Paul J. 
Parish, and that the only way plaintiff would be al-
lowed to sell insurance was to sell to people who would 
buy membership in Utah Motor Club, Inc. In Novem-
ber 1955 the State Insurance Department advised plain-
tiff that he could not sell insurance under such a plan 
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as said arrangement was unauthorized by the State and 
said plan was illegal. Plaintiff was thereby hindered 
and prevented from performing any further services 
for said defendants by their own acts. 
((12. By said acts of defendant companies they re-
pudiated their agreement with plaintiff whereby they 
induced plaintiff to render various services in building 
up a state organization on the promise of substantial 
overriding commissions in the future, although plain-
tiff performed in good faith for more than seven months 
the service required of him, to his damage in the sum 
of $10,000.00. In addition to cutting off the means of 
receiving said overriding commissions, to completely 
deprive the plaintiff of the fruits of his labors, Pre-
ferred Insurance Exchange paid the balance of his 
regular commissions to Utah Motor Club, Inc. Plaintiff 
alleges that by their conduct defendants manifested 
an intention to deprive plaintiff of not only the fruits 
of his labors, but to devise a scheme to have him 
work without compensation, and that it would be 
appropriate to assess punitive damages against defend-
ants in the sum of $25,000. 
((WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment against 
defendants in the sum of $10,000.00 actual damages, 
for $25,000.00 exemplary damages, for an accounting 
on commissions and overriding commissions, for costs 
and other appropriate relief." 
s·r_A TEMENT OF POINTS ON WHICH APPELLANT 
RELIES FOR REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT 
1. A n1otion to dismiss admits the truth of the allegation 
of the pleading which it assails. 
2. The amended complaint states facts which show that 
10 
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plaintiff is entitled to recover at least for services performed 
during a seven months' period and for expenses incurred in 
connection therewith at the instance and request of Preferred 
Insurance Exchange. 
3. Preferred Underwriters, Inc., a noncomplying foreign 
corporation, attorney-in-fact for Preferred Insurance Exchange, 
is not an indispensible party to this action. 
4. All of the defendants are liable in tort for unconscion-
able dealings behind the back of plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
A MOTION TO DISMISS ADMITS THE TRUTH OF 
THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE PLEADING WHICH IT 
ASSAILS. 
In the case of Fargo Glass & Paint Co. v. Globe American 
Corp.J 161 F. 2d 811, the Court of Appeals held that the facts 
alleged in the pleading are admitted by the motion to dismiss. 
HI£ the plaintiff is entitled to any relief under these facts, the 
motion to dismiss should have been overruled. Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Rule 8 (a) 28 U. S. C. A. following section 
723 c; Guth v. Texas Co., 7 Cir., 155 F. 2d 563." 
II. 
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES FACTS 
WHICH SHOW THAT PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO 
RECOVER AT LEAST FOR SERVICES PERFORMED DUR-
11 
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ING A SEVEN MONTHS' PERIOD AND FOR EXPENSES 
INCURRED IN CONNECTION THEREWITH AT THE 
INSTANCE AND REQUEST OF PREFERRED INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE. 
This is not a case where an agent was employed on a 
commission basis with unlimited opportunity in a given terri-
tory, and given the necessary tools to work with as an agent, 
and then the relation of principal and agent was terminated. 
This is a case where plaintiff was appointed agent and also 
state manager for a reciprocal insurance exchange which was 
just getting started in Utah. Said insurer and its attorney-in-
fact not only approved his appointment as agent, but gave 
directions to him to perform various services for said insurer, 
to appoint and train other agents, make various contacts, per-
form administrative work and other things for said insurer, 
on the promise that he would be compensated by overriding 
commissions on a substantial volume of future business. In this 
case the insurer discouraged the plaintiff from spending very 
much time vvriting insurance, and induced him to spend ap-
proxin1ately seven months to build up a sales organization; and 
after plaintiff performed those services at his own expense, 
the insurer and its attorney-in-fact made it impossible for him 
to reap the fruits of his labors by turning the state agency and 
its tnanagement over to Utah Motor Club, Inc., which plaintiff 
previous! y had contacted with a view of making it a district 
agency. 
The appropriate rule applicable to the fact situtaion of this 
case is stated in Beebe l'. Columbia Axle Co.J 233 Mo. App. 212, 
117 S. W. 2d 624, at 629: 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
UThe limitation is that, in case of an indefinite agency 
where it is revoked by the principal, if it appears that 
the agent, induced by his appointment, has in good faith 
incurred expense and devoted time and labor in the 
matter of the agency without having had a sufficient 
opportunity to recoup such from the undertaking, the 
principal will be required to compensate him in that 
behalf; for the law will not permit one thus to deprive 
another of value without awarding just compensation. 
The just principle acted upon by the courts in the cir-
cumstances suggested requires no more than that, in 
every instance, the agent shall be afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to avail himself of the primary expendi-
tures and efforts put forth to the end of executing the 
authority conferred upon him and that, if such oppor-
tunity is denied him, the principal shall compensate 
him accordingly." 
The foregoing rule was quoted and adopted in the case 
of Fargo Glass & Paint Co. v. Globe American Corporation, 
161 F. 2d 811. The court adopted the Missouri rule to the effect 
that an orally appointed agent for an indefinite time, who, 
induced by his appointment, has in good faith incurred ex-
penses and devoted time and labor to the agency without having 
had sufficient opportunity to recoup, is entitled to compensation 
therefor from his principal. In the Fargo case, ((The defendant 
says it may cancel the contract with impunity." The Court of 
Appeals held otherwise. 
It was argued in the District Court that plaintiff was ap-
pointed by Paul J. Parish, and that plaintiff should look to 
Parish for compensation. The amended complaint shows that 
Preferred Underwriters, Inc., appointed Parish state agent, 
and directed him to appoint other agents and to build up a 
state organization. Furthermore, the amended complaint shows 
13 
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that after plaintiff was appointed an agent for Preferred In-
surance Exchange and acting state manager, said Preferred 
Insurance Exchange and its attorney-in-fact approved said 
appointment and gave instructions and directions to the plain-
tiff. Said two companies instructed him to appoint oth~r agents 
and train agents which he did, and said companies recognized 
the agents so appointed. 
In Hall v. Douglas Aircraft Co., (Cal. App.), 73 P. 2d 
668 (hearing denied by Supreme Court), it was pointed out 
that where a principal ratifies the appointment of a subagent 
and gives directions to the subagent in conducting negotiations, 
the principal constitutes such subagent its own agent. Further-
more, the court held in that case that the principal could not 
defeat the right to compensation on a contingent basis by 
wiping out the margin or ((differential" on which the contin-
gent compensation was to be computed. The District Court 
of Appeal held that the agent was entitled to reasonable value 
of his services under such circumstances. 
In the case of Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, Inc., 1 Utah 2nd 
9, 261 P. 2d 927, this Honorable Court recognized the basic 
rule that a principal who agrees that commission shall be paid 
only on a consummated sale, contemplates the duty of the 
principal to cooperate in good faith toward the consummation 
of a sale, and that the principal cannot defeat the right of the 
agent to compensation by arbitrarily refusing to cooperate. 
Restate1nent of the Lau·,. Agency, Chapter 14, deals with 
duties of the principal to the agent. There are a number of 
significant obligations of the principal for fair dealing with 
an agent: 
14 
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((A principal is subject to a duty to an agent to 
perform the contract which he has made with the 
agent." (Page 1000). 
((A principal has a duty not to repudiate or terminate 
the employment in violation of the contract of em-
ployment." (Page 1060). · 
"If the compensation of the agent is dependent upon 
his accomplishment of a result and this result can be 
accomplished only if the principal cooperates, the prin-
cipal's promise to give such cooperation is inferred un-
less there are manifestations to the contrary." (Page 
1002). 
((Except where the relationship of the parties, the 
triviality of the services, or other circumstances indi-
cate that the parties have agreed otherwise, it is inferred 
that one who requests or permits another to perform 
services for him as his agent promises to pay for them." 
(Page 1027). 
((A principal for whom an agent has performed 
services in accordance with a voidable contract which 
is avoided by one of the parties, or for whom an agent 
or purported agent has performed services without a 
promise by the principal to pay, is subject to liability 
to the agent to the extent that he has been unjustly 
enriched by such services." (Page 1077). 
((A principal is subject to liability to an agent for 
his own conduct as he is to third persons for similar 
conduct . . . " (Page 1104) . 
(( . . . Correlativ~ with the duties of the agent to 
serve loyally and obediently are the principal's duties 
of compensation, indemnity, and protection .... In 
addition, the principal is subject to liability to the agent, 
as to any third person, for conduct which would be 
tortious aside from the relationship, and is subject to 
quasi-contractual liability if he is unjustly enriched at 
the agent's expense." (Page 999). 
15 
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The amended complaint does not merely show that 
plaintiff had a valuable and attractive contract with Paul J. 
Parish whereby he could expect $1,000.00 per month. The 
amended complaint shows that in April 1955 said Preferred 
Insurance Exchange and its attorney-in-fact, Preferred Under-
writers, Inc., made an express agreement with plaintiff which 
said insurance companies violated with impunity after inducing 
plaintiff to work for seven months performing various services 
for Preferred Insurance Exchange on the promise that he was 
going to reap a very substantial harvest of overriding com-
missions in the future. The amended complaint shows that 
said companies arbitrarily and maliciously deprived plaintiff 
of opportunity to receive those commissions which he had been 
promised, and made it impossible for Parish to perform his 
contract with plaintiff. There was more than a mere implied 
promise on the part of Preferred Insurance Exchange. The 
bargain was not merely to be paid a commission on the policies 
he sold personally, but to receive in the future overriding 
commissions on the sales made by others. 
In giving instructions and directions to plaintiff, said 
companies as principal and as attorney-in-fact, told plaintiff 
to procure for himself state licenses to sell automobile and fire 
insurance, which he did; and to proceed to appoint district 
and local agents, which he did in reliance on the promise of 
said companies; and that plaintiff traveled through Utah for 
seven months at his own expense to find suitable agents for 
Preferred Insurance Exchange, and said defendants recognized 
the agents he appointed. Said companies also told plaintiff 
not to concern hin1self with quotas for the tin1e being, nor be 
16 
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too much concerned about selling policies himself, but to 
direct his chief efforts to finding suitable agents, to bel p train 
agents, to take care of administrative work, to conduct investi-
gations requested by said defendants, and to make other con-
tacts deemed essential to said defendants to promote good 
public relations. Said companies told plaintiff that he would 
make a substantial income out of overriding commissions from 
future business in Utah, and that notwithstanding some time 
would elapse before such income would be obtained, as the 
program was a long range program, he would obtain a much 
greater income than if he spent his time selling. Plaintiff per-
formed all services requested. 
The amended complaint shows that said two companies 
made the following promises to induce plaintiff to perform a 
variety of services, on which promises plaintiff relied in good 
faith in performing services, and which promises said com-
panies failed to perform: 
( 1) Defendants promised to furnish promptly to plaintiff 
effective advertising matter to start a sales campaign. Instead, 
Preferred Insurance Exchange, and Preferred Underwriters, 
Inc., (its attorney-in-fact), sent plaintiff advertising material 
which was false and misleading, which represented that Pre-
ferred Insurance Exchange offered lower rates than competitors, 
when in fact some rates were higher. Although plaintiff in-
formed said defendants that said material was having an 
adverse effect in Utah, said defendants did not make any new 
advertising material available until September 1955, just prior 
to the time Utah Motor Club, Inc., was appointed state agent 
for Preferred Insurance Exchange by Preferred Underwriters, 
Inc. 
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Sections 31-27-8 and 9, U. C. A. 1953, prohibit the dis-
semination and circulation of false information or misrepre-
sentation of the benefits of a policy. Consequently, the defend-
ants did not give plaintiff the tools to work with which were 
express! y promised as a means of enabling plaintiff to obtain 
a substantial income. 
( 2) Said de£ end ants promised to file with the State In-
surance Department all necessary rate schedules essential to 
meet competitors, to enable plaintiff and local agents to obtain 
a substantial volume of business. Said defendants did not file 
any competitive rate schedules until July 1955, nor until plaintiff 
himself conducted the investigations requested by said de-
fendants. Said defendants then turned the state agency over 
to Utah Motor Club, Inc., and made it impossible for plaintiff 
to get any volume of business at all. 
( 3) Said defendants promised to file any other documents 
which might be essential to carry on a diversified insurance 
business in Utah. Said defendants did not even file a power 
of attorney for plaintiff, nor file the necessary documents essen-
tial to fully qualify said defendants to engage in business in 
Utah. 
( 4) Said defendants promised in April to furnish without 
delay assistance in the training of agents for selling insurance. 
The defendants delayed until September the sending of any 
representative to Utah to give any assistance in a sales training 
program. Then it made a deal to oust the plaintiff and to 
deny him the protnised benefits of such a program. 
( 5) Said defendants promised to furnish plaintiff such 
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further assistance as would be necessary to build up a state 
organization in Utah to assure Parish and plaintiff a good 
volume of business and a substantial income. Plaintiff relied 
on all of the promises of said defendants, and traveled through 
Utah at his own expense to find suitable agents for Preferred 
Insurance Exchange, who were recognized as agents by said 
defendants; and plaintiff conducted all investigations requested 
by defendants, made all contacts requested and performed all 
other administrative duties assigned to him by said two defend-
ant companies between April and October 195 5, at his own 
expense. Instead of giving plaintiff assistance essential to help 
build up a state organization in Utah to assure Parish and 
plaintiff a good volume of business and a substantial income, 
after learning that plaintiff had contacted Utah ~{otor Club, 
Inc., in an effort to appoint said corporation a district agent, 
Preferred Insurance Exchange, Preferred Underwriters, Inc., 
and Murray & Company, without the consent of either Parish 
or plaintiff on or about September 28, 195 5, entered into an 
agreement with Utah Motor Club. Inc., whereby said motor 
club was appointed state agent in Utah. Said defendants pro-
cured from plaintiff his list of contacts of insurance prospects 
for the purpose of giving the same to Utah Motor Club, Inc., 
to reap benefits from the efforts of plaintiff without cotnpen-
sation. In September 1955, said Preferred Insurance Exchange 
and Preferred Underwriters, Inc., induced plaintiff to go to 
the expense and take the time necessary to arrange for a meeting 
of all district and local agents, on the promise that he was going 
to have a substantial income from his position, while at the 
same time said companies were negotiating behind his back 
to deprive him of present and future overriding commissions 
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which he had been promised, and to transfer the business 
over to Utah Motor Club, Inc., without any compensation to 
plaintiff whatsoever, and to make it impossible for Parish to 
perform his contract with plaintiff. 
Plaintiff was not given notice of termination of his em-
ployment, nor compensation for his services. In October 195 5, 
said companies falsely represented to plaintiff that Parish had 
resigned as state agent, and instructed him to contact Utah 
~Jotor Club, Inc. About November 1, 1955, said Utah Motor 
Club, Inc., told plaintiff it had been appointed state agent and 
that the only way he would be allowed to sell insurance was 
to sell to people who would buy membership in the Utah 
Motor Club, Inc. The State Insurance Department advised 
plaintiff that such an arrangement was unauthorized and that 
said plan was illegal. (Such practices are prohibited by Sections 
31-27-14, 15 and 22, U. C. A. 1953). The plaintiff was thereby 
hindered and prevented from performing any further services 
for said insurance companies, and the means of receiving the 
pron1ised overriding commissions was cut off. The plaintiff 
performed services for seven months on the promise that he 
\vould receive a substantial overriding commission in the future. 
This case is a much stronger case than the one mentioned 
in the Fargo case where notice of termination was given, and 
in which case the judgn1ent of dismissal was reversed. 
III. 
PREFERRED UNDERWRITERS, INC., A NONCOM-
PLYING FOREIGN CORPORATION, ATTORNEY-IN-
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FACT FOR PREFERRED INSURANCE EXCHANGE, IS 
NOT AN INDISPENSIBLE PARTY TO THIS ACTION. 
The fact that Preferred Underwriters, Inc., could not be 
served with summons because it is a noncomplying foreign 
corporation, which has failed to have a process agent in this 
State, does not show that its principal Preferred Insurance 
Exchange is immune from liability. 
The amended complaint alleges that Preferred Insurance 
Exchange was and is an unincorporated reciprocal insurance 
exchange in business in Utah through state, district and local 
agents, writing automobile and liability insurance. Preferred 
Underwriters, Inc., was and is the attorney-in-fact for Preferred 
Insurance Exchange, but said Preferred Underwriters, Inc., is 
a foreign corporation engaged in business in Utah as a general 
insurance agency for writing fire and other insurance, although 
it has never qualified to do business in Utah. The fact that 
service of summons was obtained on Preferred Insurance 
Exchange indicates that it has a process agent in Utah. The 
statutes do not require the attorney-in-fact to be joined in a 
suit against a reciprocal insurer. 
Section 31-10-3, U. C. A. 1953, specifies: 
nA (reciprical insurer' as used in this code means 
any such unincorporated aggregation of subscribers 
operating through an attorney in fact individually and 
collectively as an insurance organization for the benefit 
of its policyholders." 
Section 31-10-11, U. C. A. 1953, defines the rights and 
powers of an attorney-in-fact for a reciprocal insurer: 
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( ( ( 1) The rights and powers of the attorney of a 
reciprocal insurer shall be as provided in the power of 
attorney given it by the subscribers. 
(( (2) The power of attorney must set forth: 
(( (a) The powers of the attorney; 
(((b) That the attorney is empowered to accept 
service of process on behalf of the insurer and to au-
thorize the commissioner to receive service of process 
in actions against the insurer upon contracts exchanged; 
* * * " 
Notwithstanding the attorney-in-fact for a reciprocal in-
surer or exchange can make contracts for the reciprocal insurer, 
our statute which permits the operation of reciprocal insurance 
exchanges, specifically declares that a reciprocal insurer may 
rrsue and be sued in its own name" (Sec. 31-10-6 ,U. C. A. 
195 3). The statute clearly indicates that the reciprocal insurer 
rna y be sued as principal; and the mere fact that its attorney-
in-fact is a noncomplying foreign corporation which has failed 
to appoint a process agent in the State of Utah, does not prevent 
an injured party from suing the insurance exchange as principal 
for the acts or omissions of the principal and its attorney-in-
fact acfing on behalf of the reciprocal insurer. 
Section 16-8-3, U. C. A. 953, referring to the disabilities 
of noncomplying foreign corporations, states that ((every con-
tract, agreement and transaction whatsoever made or entered 
into by or on behalf of any such corporation within this state 
shall be wholly void on behalf of such corporation and its as-
signees and every person deriving any interest or title there-
from, but shall be valid and enforceable against such corpora-
tion, assignee and person; and any person acting as agent of 
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a foreign corporation which shall neglect or refuse to comply 
with the foregoing provisions is guilty of a misdemeanor and 
shall be personally liable on any and all contracts made in this 
state by him for or on behalf of such corporation during the 
time that it shall be so in default." 
The contract made by Preferred Underwriters, Inc., at 
attorney-in-fact for Preferred Insurance Exchange, with Parish 
and also the contract made with plaintiff subsequently, were 
contracts to be performed in this State. Neither Parish nor 
plaintiff consented to the abrogation of those agreements. To 
deny to a noncomplyng foreign corporation the right to main-
tain any action to enforce the same, while making such con-
tracts enforceable against such corporation and its beneficiary, 
would be nullified entirely if a noncomplying foreign corpor-
ation acting as agent can make a contract which it can repudiate 
at will after it has obtained the benefits it seeks for its principal. 
It would seem that the right to cancel a contract is a contract 
right, and that the disability to exercise a contract right by a 
noncomplying foreign corporation precludes the exercise of 
a right to terminate an agreement. If it does not, that still 
would not make the conduct lawful in this case, nor insulate 
the principal from liability. A reciprocal insurer which acts 
through a noncomplying foreign corporation certainly does 
not have greater rights and immunities by reason of such non-
{:Ompliance with the law than it would have if the attorney-in-
fact were qualified under the laws of this State. 
Obviously, the statutes contemplate that an attorney-in-
fact for a reciprocal insurer shall be one which is qualified to 
transact business in this State. The failure to have a qualified 
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attorney-in-fact certainly does not exempt the reciprocal in-
surer from liability as principal, either in contract or in tort. 
IV. 
i\LL OF THE DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE IN TORT 
FOR UNCONSCIONABLE DEALING BEHIND THE BACK 
OF PLAINTIFF. 
One of plaintiff's prospects for district agent was Utah 
Motor Club, Inc. Preferred Insurance Exchange, Preferred 
Undervvriters, and Wayne Murray and Wayne Murray, Jr., 
knew of the contract relationship with plaintiff. Said defendants 
other than Utah Motor Club, Inc., induced the plaintiff to 
perform additional services in September 1955 on the promise 
that he would reap a substantia1 income from future overriding 
commissions, and in connection therewith had him go to the 
expense of a sales conference with the various agents. Said 
defendants behind the plaintiff's back and without the knowl-
edge or approval of Paul J. Parish, made a deal with Utah 
Motor Club, Inc., to make it impossible for said defendants 
to perform their agreement with plaintiff to pay overriding 
commissions. In addition, they made it impossible for plaintiff 
to do any selling or to obtain the fruits of his seven months' 
work. Furthermore, said defendants arranged to transfer to 
Utah Motor Club, Inc., plaintiff's list of insurance prospects, 
and also paid over to Utah Motor Club, Inc., the balance of the 
regular con1missions which plaintiff had earned. Utah Motor 
Club, Inc., knew of plaintiff's position, and it had no right to 
take those funds, nor to aid in the scheme to circumvent plain· 
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tiff's position and destroy his right to receive overriding com-
missions on future business. 
As pointed out in Restatement of the Law, Agency, page 
999, a principal is liable to an agent for conduct which would be 
tortious aside from the relationship. Defendants made it impos-
sible for plaintiff to perform any further services by requiring 
him to sell insurance on a basis which is prohibited by law, 
and which the State Insurance Department advised him would 
be illegal. 
The tort rule is illustrated in Skene v. Carayanis, 103 Conn. 
708, 131 A. 497, 498: 
(( ... the principle ... holds liable him who, know-
ingly and without adequate justification, causes another 
to breach his contract. R and W Hat Shop, Inc. v. 
Sculley, 98 Conn. 1,119 A. 55, 29 A. L. R. 551. The 
law does not, however, restrict its protection to rights 
resting upon completed contracts, but it also forbids 
unjustifiable intereference with any man's right to 
pursue his lawful business or occupation, and to secure 
to himself the earnings of his industry. Full, fair, 
and free competition is necessary to the economic life 
of a community, but under its guise, no ~man can, by 
unlawful means, prevent another from obtaining the 
fruits of his labor. 'The weapons used by the trader 
who relies upon this right for justification must be 
those furnished by the laws of trade, or, at least, must 
not be inconsistent with their free operation. No man 
can justify interference with another man's business 
through fraud or misrepresentation, nor by intimida-
tion, obstruction, or molestation.' Martell v. White, 
185 Mass. 255, 261, 69 N. E. 1085, 1088, 64 L.R.A. 
260, 102 Am. St. Rep. 341; Auburn Draying Co. v. 
Wardell, 227 N. Y. 1, 11, 124 N. E. 97, 6 A. L. R. 
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901; Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 123 Minn. 
17, 31, 142 N. W. 930, 1136, L. R. A. 1915 B, 1179, 
1195." 
The defendants other than Utah Motor Club, Inc., prom-
ised plaintiff that they would make no agreement with Utah 
Motor Club, Inc., which would not be satisfactory to plaintiff. 
The law does not countenance the unconscionable conduct of a 
principal and its officers in dealing with a prospect of the 
agent to destroy the position and the promised economic future 
of the agent. 
The plaintiff asked for $10,000.00 general damages, and 
$25,000.00 punitive damages. Both are justified. 
CONCLUSION 
The amended complaint states facts to warrant recovery 
against each of the defendants. The motion to dismiss should 
have been overruled, as the same is without merit. It was also 
error for the District Court to enter a judgment of dismissal, 
although the judgment was made nwithout prejudice." The 
plaintiff is entitled to judicial relief, as involuntary servitude 
would be accomplished if plaintiff were denied relief. We 
respectfully submit that the judgment of the District Court 
should be reversed, with costs to appellant, and that the cause 
should be remanded with directions to overrule the motion to 
dismiss. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL E. REIMANN 
720 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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